Deliberation and the First-Person Perspective

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Abstract

This essay argues that normativists about belief have failed to take seriously the possibility that it may sometimes be permissible to believe without adequate evidence.
Instead, they frequently assume that deliberation about what to believe must necessarily attend solely to what there is adequate evidence to believe. We cannot grant this assumption without prejudging the very issue which normativism is supposed to address.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)35-57
Number of pages22
JournalTeorema
Volume35
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Keywords

  • belief
  • evidence
  • deliberation
  • transparancy
  • normativity

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