Abstract
This essay argues that normativists about belief have failed to take seriously the possibility that it may sometimes be permissible to believe without adequate evidence.
Instead, they frequently assume that deliberation about what to believe must necessarily attend solely to what there is adequate evidence to believe. We cannot grant this assumption without prejudging the very issue which normativism is supposed to address.
Instead, they frequently assume that deliberation about what to believe must necessarily attend solely to what there is adequate evidence to believe. We cannot grant this assumption without prejudging the very issue which normativism is supposed to address.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 35-57 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Teorema |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- belief
- evidence
- deliberation
- transparancy
- normativity